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RÉSUNIÉ 
C'est une tendance mondiale qui introduit de la compétition aux industries de 
réseau auparavant monopolistes. Afin d'augmenter le bien-être, les régulateurs 
de différents juridictions dépensent beaucoup d'effort pour restructurer les 
industries de manière efficace via la sélection adéquate, le design et 
l'implémentation de régimes d'un prix d'accès. 
Dans ce mémoire, on analyse quelques principes généraux, des faits 
fondamentaux et des points critiques sur le développement de réseaux et 
l'accès à ces derniers. Ensuite on continue avec une discussion sur les théories 
classiques de prix d'accès: la règle efficiente d'attribution de prix (ECPR, 
Efficient Component Pricing Rule), la règle d'attribution de prix de Ramsey, 
la limite globale de prix, et la politique d'attribution de prix selon les coûts. 
Après on applique les options réelles et on calcule les moments optimaux 
d'investissement pour deux cas: avec ou sans la menace d'une compagnie 
entrante. Finalement, on conclut ce mémoire en interprétant les résultats de 
l'analyse et en fournissant quelques conséquences des politiques choisies. 
Traditionnellement, ·1' attribution de prix prend en considération l'utilisation 
efficiente du réseau; ce mémoire décrit l'impact du prix d'accès sur 
l'incitation pour investir au réseau. 
On n'emploie que la recherche secondaire, y compris des périodiques, des 
monographies et sources de l'internet. L'une des limitations majeures de ce 
mémoire est qu'on n'emploie pas des données réelles des problèmes pratiques 
parce qu'il s'agit d'une analyse générale. 
Mots-clés: options réelles, développement de réseaux, accès aux réseaux, 
politique d'attribution de prix d'accès, réglementation 
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ABSTRACT 
There is a worldwide trend to bring competition into the formerly 
monopolistic network industries. To increase total welfare, regulators across 
different jurisdictions spend significant amount of resources aiming to 
effectively and effieiently restructure the industries via proper selection, 
design, and implementation of access pricing regimes. 
ln this mémoire, 1 first review sorne general principles, fundamental facts, and 
critieal issues regarding network development and network aceess. Secondly, 1 
proceed with a discussion on the "classical" aceess pricing theories including 
Efficient Component Prieing Rule (ECPR), Ramsey Pricing Rule, Global 
Priee Cap, and Cost-based Pricing Rule. Thirdly, 1 present the real option 
approach of calculating the incumbent's thresholds of investment under two 
different assumptions: with and without the threat of entry. Finally, 1 conclude 
the paper by interpreting the results of the analyses and providing sorne policy 
impl ieations. 
Traditionally, aceess pricing deals with the efficient use of existing network; 
my contribution with this mémoire is to characterisethe impact of aceess 
priee on the ineentives to invest in network development. 
Only secondary research method is employed, including journals, books, and 
internet resources. One of the main limitations of this mémoire is the fact that 
real-life data on practical problems encountered are not employed due to the 
nature of this generalized analysis. 
Keywords: real options, network developments, network access, access 
pricing ruIes, regulations 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In industries such as electricity transmission, natural gas transportation, 
railway tracks, and local telecommunication services, final product supply 
typieally requires access to essential2 facilities, in partieular, the networks. 
There is typically a dominant firm that possesses and controls the supply of 
one or more inputs that are vital for its competitors. There is a worldwide 
trend to bring competition into the formerly monopolistie network industries. 
To increase total welfare, regulators across different jurisdictions spend 
signifieant amount of resources aiming to effectively and efficiently 
restructure the industries via proper selection, design, and implementation of 
access prieing regimes. 
The access priees are the priees charged by the dominant firm for connection 
to its network, so that the competitors could be able to provide serviee to their 
end users. If the network owner charging for interconnection is also a supplier 
of the final product that travels through the network, it has an obvious 
incentive to overcharge the competing companies; not only to enhance 
revenue, but also to increase the competing comp~ny's cost and thus to 
effectively block entry. Therefore, a fair access pricing rule is useful for 
easing hostile competition and improving efficiency. Extra care must be taken 
in forming the regulation, as a failure to select the appropriate pricing rule 
might result in the potential gains from restructuring network utilities not 
being maximized and/or shared fairly between the users and the owners of the 
essential facilities (Valletti & Estache, 1998). 
2 In terms of essentialness, for example, un der Canadian legislation, the network is typically 
required as an critical input by competitors to provide services in a relevant downstream market; 
it is usually controlled by a fum that possesses upstream market power such that withdrawing 
mandated access to the facility would likely result in a substantial lessening or prevention of 
competition in the relevant downstream market; and last but not least, it is not practical or 
feasible for competitors to duplicate the Eunctionality of the facility (CRTC, 2008). 
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2 ACCESS PRICING: FUNDAMENTAL FACTS & ISSUES 
With the traditionally vertically integrated and heavily regulated network 
industries undertaking transition toward a more competitive environment and 
structure, there is a global movement toward deregulation, restructuring and 
privatization. Although monopo\istic or o\igopolistic markets are known for 
achieving high level of coordination and in turn benefiting the society with 
their economies of scale, it is believed that the competitive market structure is 
the most efficient way to credibly incite firms to provide efforts in minimizing 
costs and to offer their different classes of clients and customers the best 
quality products optimally matched to their specific needs (Boyer & Robert, 
1998). 
However, it may not be desirable to introduce competition in ail segments of 
the network industry because sorne of them are subject to economies of scale 
and the services of essential facilities is sometimes too costly or inefficient to 
duplicate. The stages of production that are necessary inputs to the potentially 
competitive segments should remain monopolies. Thus, one of the main 
policy focuses of promoting effective competition should be a regulated 
environment guaranteeing that competitors have sufficient access to the 
networks. 
2.1 Background Information 
Duplication of the networks is generally considered economically 
unprofitable, socially undesirable or simply infeasible. For instance, it would 
make \ittle sense to build and maintain two parallel electricity transmission 
networks in the same geographical area. However sorne activities which use 
the network as an input, or, in other words, a mean to transfer the goods and 
services, are in fact potentially competitive. The benefits of economies of 
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scale are less important over certain links where the "invisible hand" could 
bring about efficient level of suppliers and hence competitions. For example, 
the generation of electricity, the exploration and production of natural gas, the 
supply of long distance telecommunication services, and the supply of 
passenger and freight services. 
It is therefore important to first separate the network itself from the goods and 
services traveling through it then identify the bottleneck and the potentially 
competitive segments of the network. 
2.2 The Role of the Regulatory Commission 
Taking into account the critical role of the essential facilities as a compulsory 
input, also the considerable initial capital layout associated with the 
investment, the owners of the networks are regarded as having certain amount 
of monopolistic powers. How to promote efficiency and to determine the level 
of goods and services provided that is both economically and socially optimal 
are thus the central policy issues to be considered. 
The regulatory commissions are responsible for setting the rules to pre vent the 
incumbent from exercising market power and predatory self-dealings, to make 
certain that the proper goods and services are produced, and to ensure that the 
firms with access to essential facilities are the most efficient in using it. For 
the potential competitive segments, by carefully selecting access pricing 
scheme to allow the entrants to use the network facilities and to compete with 
the natural monopolies, the regulatory commissions could rely on the market 
forces to lead to an efficient number of parallel suppliers ensuring an adequate 
level of competition to emerge (Boyer & Robert, 1998). 
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2.3 The Importance of the Appropriate Access Pricing 
Increasing competition and the associated demand for access to the network 
raise the important question: what is the reasonable access price to be 
charged? 
When the priee is too low, the incumbent has no incentive for investment and 
innovation. It is equivalent to providing a subsidy to the entrant and 
encouraging ineffieient entry. In other words, if the income from granting the 
access is not sufficient to co ver sunk costs, the network provider is simply not 
compensated enough to take on the project or maintain the network; thereby 
social welfare is reduced due to future insufficient supply of final goods and 
services. 
When the price is too high, the efficient entrants are discouraged from 
entering, which in tum causes competition not to prevail. Also, the 
competitors may begin to have incentive to inefficiently bypass the 
incumbent's facilities. In this case, the CUITent social welfare will be reduced 
because of the reduction in competition. 
In addition, in terms of appropriate access prieing there are two policy 
implication of partieular importance: first, the long-term impact on 
infrastructure construction as weil as the associated productive efficiency (the 
cheapest cost for a given output mix) and allocative efficiency (the best 
product mix for society for a given level of scarcity of recourses); and second, 
the profits enjoyed by entrant and incumbent. 
In the following, several access pricing rules will be introduced. It is 
important to determine the proper regulation for attaining an efficient 
allocation of resources via setting efficient access charges. Hypothetically, 
under the optimal pricing scheme, it will be the incumbent's best interest to 
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grant the most efficient firms with access to the bottleneck segments, even if 
this means bringing in competition into the previously monopolistic or 
oligopolistic environment. 
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3 ACCESS PRICING RULES 
The c1assical methods introduced below are static; therefore, the y assume 
prospective events with certainty and do not account for stochastie changes in 
cash flows. Also they generally disregard the signifieance of sunk costs and 
the irreversibility of the investments. 
AlI the following access pricing methods have their advantages and 
disadvantages. The quality of the pricing rules should be judged on their 
effectiveness of encouraging competitions, avoiding inefficient bypasses, as 
weIl as creating incentives for both timely and efficient investment, 
maintenance, and utilization of network infrastructures. 
3.1 The Efficient Component Pricing Rule: (ECPR) 
3.1.1 General Information 
As discussed in Baumol & Sidak (1994), Laffont & Tirole (1994) and 
Armstrong et al. (1996) the "Baumol-Willig Efficient Component Pricing 
Rule" (ECPR) basic ail y states that the appropriate access priee charged by the 
incumbent to the providers of a complementary component or service, which 
the incumbent also produces, is a fee equal to the sum of the average 
incremental costs of the access and the incumbent's opportunity costs of 
providing the access, inc1uding any forgone revenues from a associated 
reduction in the incumbent's sales of the complementary component. Hence, it 
is often expected the access priee to exceed the direct incremental costs of 
access. 
Aceess priee = Direct incremental costs of aceess + lncumbent's opportunity 
costs of providing aceess Oost revenue) 
ECPR ensures that competitors of the complementary component would 
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decide to enter the market only if they are at least as efficient as the incumbent 
in the production of the complementary compone nt; i.e. the ECPR ensures 
that the production will not be diverted to an inefficient produeer since only 
firms who are more efficient than the incumbent will find it profitable to enter 
the market and aceess the network. 
3.1.2 The Assumptions of the ECPR 
The ECPR holds only under sorne very restricted assumptions. For example, it 
is assumed that the incumbent's priee for the complementary service has been 
based on a marginal-cost pricing ruIe; the incumbent's and the competitors' 
components are perfect substitutes; the production technology of the 
component experiences constant return to scale; the competitors have no 
market power; and the incumbent's marginal cost of production of the 
component can be accurately observed. The application of ECPR rule is thus 
considered relatively complicated due to the complexity of the assumptions 
(Armstrong, Doyle, & Vickers, 1996). 
3.1.3 The Logic of the ECPR 
Suppose that there are two firrns in a network industry: namely, an incumbent 
and an entrant, both of which produce a homogeneous product using the same 
network as an input. The price of the incumbent's final product is fixed by 
regulation3 and hence the total quantity demanded is fixed as weIl. The entrant 
is a "priee taker" and assumed to take the incumbent's priee of the final 
product as given. 
3 The assumption, that the final priees being optimally set by the regulator to elirninate monopoly 
rent, is observed often in real practice. 
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Based on the ECPR, the aceess priee should be set as the following: 
a 
p 
Priee of a unit of aceess 
Incumbent's incremental (direct marginal) costs incurred 
from giving the aceess to an entrant 
Given priee of the final product 
Incumbent's marginal cost of production (including both 
the co st of upstream essential facility and the downstream 
products) 
Incumbent's marginal profit from suppJying final product 
itself; the marginal opportunity co st incurred by the 
incumbent in providing a unit of aceess to the entrant 
When p = Cm, the aceess priee is prieed to be equal to the incumbent's 
incremental costs incurred from giving aceess to the entrant, thus a = Ci. 
The logic of the ECPR will be readily demonstrated by a numerical example 
in terms of natural gas transmission serviees (the other industries mentioned 
above could be easily applied). 
The incumbent owns the network of pipelines P, proeesses natural gas at site 
S, and then transfers it to residential and commercial customers, denoted Cr 
and C· respectively, via P. AlI of the customers must reeeive the product 
through the incumbent's network. There is at least one other potential or 
actual natural gas produeer/proeessor that could supply its product to the 
customers. However, we assume that the competitor only owns the production 
facilities at site S*; while the incumbent owns both the production facilities at 
site S and the network P. Therefore, P is the bottleneck, and S is the 
complementary component that is potentially under competition. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of a network system with the incumbent and the entrant. 
Suppose that the incumbent charges a priee of $lO/MMBTU for transferring a 
unit of natural gas to Cr or Cc from S via P. Suppose further that the 
incumbent's marginal co st of providing this service is $2 for segment SP and 
$5 for segment PCr or PCc (including the relevant marginal costs of network 
P). The EPCR simply states that the appropriate priee or fee for the incumbent 
to charge to the competitor for having access to network P and for providing 
the product to Cr or Cc via the network P is $8: the $5 of marginal cost 
relevant to segment Pc, or PCc plus the forgone net revenue of $3 that the 
mono poli st loses when the rival for transferring natural gas to Cr or Cc from 
S* via P in lieu of the incumbent. 
If the rival is being charged a fee of $8 for access, and the incumbent is 
charging $10 as its priee for Spc, or SPC·, then the rival will be able to offer 
its product without incurring losses only if its marginal costs for segment S*p 
are at or below $2: i.e. at or below the marginal costs over SP of the 
incumbent. 
Thus by construction, the ECPR ensures the competitor entering and 
producing in the market only if its costs are not greater than those of the 
incumbent. It guarantees the inefficient diversion of production away from the 
incumbent not to occur. 
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Under the previous assumption, i.e. identical technology, cost structure, and 
products, with the presence of access charges, firms would still compete and 
undercut each other till no extra profits left in the final market. Thus the priee 
to the final users should be set to equal the marginal co st of production. In 
other words, if setting the prices equal to marginal costs does not result in a 
loss to any players of the market; both productive and allocative efficiencies 
are achieved at the same time. The optimal situation for society as a whole is 
achieved since the marginal benefit to the society (priee that consumer is 
willing to pay) of one more unit of production is exactly identieal to the 
marginal cost to the society (the production co st of the firm). Thus the 
resulting allocation from ECPR is said to provide global effieiency and 
therefore is the "first best access pricing policy" (Armstrong, Doyle, & 
Vickers, 1996). 
The incumbent's opportunity cost P-Cm is basically the displacement of the 
incumbent's market due to granting access to the entrant. This displacement 
then results in a loss of variable profits for the incumbent. This reduction will 
in tum cause the incumbent not able to coyer its fixed costs. Rence, to achieve 
optimal efficiency, the entrant is obligated to coyer this loss by compensating 
the incumbent's opportunity cost of providing access. 
The ECPR therefore has two important properties. First, it sends the right 
social signal to potential entrants since only the more efficient entrants will 
find it profitable to enter. Second, being fully covered un der ECPR, it is 
indifferent for the incumbent to grant the access or not; the profit for the 
incumbent should be the same with or without access. 
3.1.4 Relaxing Sorne of the Assumptions 
The market displacement for the incumbent can be evaluated in different 
contexts. In order to build a more comprehensive model to tackle sorne 
Il 
complex and realistic cases, the assumptions of no bypass and homogeneous 
products of the previous model are relaxed. In reality, product differentiation 
(heterogeneous products), bypass (competitor building another network 
facilities), uncertainty in demand, input substitution, multiproduct firms and 
multi-access (entry in the network at different points or nodes) ail have 
different impact on incumbent's opportunity co st of giving the access. 
Let us now place our attention on product differentiation in the environment 
of possible bypassing. If the entrant, while still requiring the network as a 
critical input, offers a new final product different from the final product 
offered by the incumbent; it is then not necessary for the entrant to be fully 
responsible for the displacement of the incumbent's market. The loss of 
incumbent should no longer be fully compensated by the entrant, since the 
reduction in sales may result from the diversity in products. Renee an entrant 
with a differentiated product may still increase the social welfare even if it 
means that the incumbent is not fully covered. In the extreme case of 
independent products, the entrant has no impact on the incumbent's market; 
therefore, the ECPR would fix the access price at the direct cost of access 
only. 
To represent the above-mentioned effects, the second term on the right hand 
side of the ECPR equation is modified into a(p - cm) with a = X~ . 
-Za 
X(P.a) 
z(P.a) 
CI 
Incumbent's equilibrium production of the final products 
Equilibrium demand for access by the entrant 
Displacement ratio, represents the reduction in demand for the 
incumbent's products caused by providing the competition with the 
marginal unit of aceess 
The expression a(p - cm) is the opportunity cost to the incumbent in 
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providing the marginal unit of aceess to the entrant. In particular, it strictly 
measures the part of the loss in incumbent's profit that is due to providing the 
aceess. 
Renee, under more complex environment without homogeneous goods and 
with bypass possibilities, the equilibrium access price will be based on 
opportunity cost that is the product of the incumbent's marginal profit per unit 
sold and the ratio of the marginal impact of an increase in access charge on the 
incumbent's output and the marginal impact of this increase on the demand for 
aceess by the entrants. 
Consequently, the equation for access priee is now revised into: 
3.1.5 The Limitation of the ECPR 
The main controversy regarding the ECPR is its dependency on the 
incumbent's retail priees. As the ECPR takes priee of the final good as given, 
if the incumbent were not to priee efficiently in the first plaee, it is possible 
that the monopoly rents is embedded in the final priee. Thus, the loss of 
revenue to the incumbent due to the entry should not be completely borne by 
the entrant. 
Also, the proper method of accounting for the lost market share is also a 
coneem. Row to distinguish the demand that is taken away by the entrant 
from the incumbent and the new demand created by the entrant itself is a 
critieal issue in determined the opportunity cost of the incumbent. 
In general, it is extremely difficult to achieve the theoretical "first best" 
13 
allocation with prieing based on marginal costs. When the market is not 
contestable4, by simply setting the aceess priee equal to the sum of 
incumbent's incremental cost incurred from giving aceess to the entrant and 
its corresponding opportunity cost, only the lost variable costs are recovered. 
One should not forget that the bottleneck owner also incurs a fixed cost F 
which represents the initial investment for setting up the network or sorne 
other costs deriving from social obligations that cause losses to the bottle neck 
provider (Valletti & Estache, 1998). Following the ECPR, the incumbent 
could only recover the variable costs and would suffer a loss equal to the fixed 
cost, if it were not compensated by a third party such as the regulatory 
commission. Consequently, instead of the "first best", regulators often try to 
come up with an aceess pricing rule attempting to achieve the "second best5". 
3.1.6 The M-ECPR 
According to Sidak and Spulber (1997), a Market Determined Efficient 
Component Prieing Rule, M-ECPR, could be applied when the entrant 
supplies the final good at the priee lower than the incumbent's. The main 
differenee between the M-ECPR and ECPR is that the entrant's final priee is 
employed instead of the incumbent's; that is: 
Entrant's priee of the final product 
~ The real world effect of uncertainty and irreversibility is assumed away under the contestability 
arguments. 
5 If one optimality condition in an economic mode! is not satisfied, it is possible that the next-
best solution involves changing other variables away from the ones that are usually assumed to be 
optimal. In other word,s, second best is considered when the true optimum (the fltst best) is 
unavailable due to constraints on policy choice. For more information please refer to "The 
General Theory of Second Best" (Lipsey & Lancaster, 1956). 
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More specifieally, the M-ECPR "corrects" the ECPR. In essence, by linking 
the access charge together with the entrant's priee of final goods, it is expected 
that the M-ECPR, while keeping the benefits of ECPR (only allowing efficient 
competitors to entry) will eliminate the possible monopoly rent due to ECPR's 
dependency on the prieing of the incumbent. 
However, the validity of the M-ECPR is sometimes criticized. For example, 
due to the fact that the network industry is typically not a competitive market, 
the "market determined" price does not actually exist. Furthermore, argued by 
Economides (1997), the pricing rules, such as the ECPR and the M-ECPR, 
based on private opportunity costs, would result in pricing inefficiency and 
lower social surplus than the pricing based on social opportunity costs. Here 
the private opportunity costs refer to the benefit or cost to a private party of a 
certain activity; and in general does not reflect the cost of resources to society. 
3.2 The Ramsey Pricing Rule 
3.2.1 General Information 
Given the cost structure of most regulated sectors, the ECPR is defieient for 
full recovery of fixed costs. Suppose that the monopolist is unable to eam 
sufficient revenue in the bottleneck market to cover its total costs; many of the 
economie studies intend to solve this problem by introducing variations to the 
marginal cost pricing. In the absence of any other source of funds, aiming to 
eliminate the incumbent's loss of fixed cost, the regulator could set the 
efficient access price subject to a budget constraint face by the firm. In other 
words, it attempts to minimize the distortions of the marginal cost pricing and 
to allow the incumbent to break even. 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to point out the pre mise of the 
following analyses. In practice, the final products supplied are generally not 
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homogeneous. For the instance of a natural gas company, it often offers 
different products to meet the different needs of its residential, commercial, or 
industrial customers. Even if the physical attributes of the final products were 
similar, the y might still carry different value to different downstream users. It 
is thus expected that each group of consumers has different priee elastieity of 
demand. 
In order to recover the fixed cost, the firm could choose the strategy of 
charging each group of customers with different prices for the same products 
or services, and be benefit from receiving the maximum prices that each group 
is willing to pay. The customized mark-ups6 on top of the marginal costs 
should be inversely related to the elastieities of demand. Comparing to the 
"first best" situation under the ECPR, only the "second best" is feasible under 
this methodology. In literatures, it is mostly referred to as the Ramsey or 
sometimes the Boiteux-Ramsey Pricing Rule suggested by F. P. Ramsey 
(1927) or M. Boiteux (1956). To achieve global effieiency, the Ramsey 
Prieing Rule chooses the incumbent's retai! priees and access charges 
simultaneously to maximize welfare (Laffont & Tirole, 1994). In other words, 
the regulator selects the set of prices for final products that maximizes the 
consumer's surplus while manages covering both the variable and fixed costs. 
Theoretically, contributions from the customers are extracted from the priees 
they pay for the final products. The resulting Ramsey price would involve, in 
essence, a tax that is imposed on the final products. If the rival is the low cost 
producer, the rival pays the tax to the monopolist as a part of the access 
charge. To ensure the optimality, the regulator would need to standardize 
directly the tax and the resulting priee of the final products. 
(, Here the "Mark-up" is defined as the difference between the price and the marginal cast and 
has the same unit as price. The ward "mark-up" is expected ta be interchangeable with ward 
"tax" in the fallawing paragraph. 
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3.2.2 The Logic of the Ramsey Pricing Rule 
Assume there are two related segments of one industry, one upstream, the 
network (bottleneck), and one downstream, the potentially competitive sector 
segment. The bottleneck is fully controlled by an incumbent firm denoted by 
J. In the downstream market, the incumbent faces competition from an entrant 
denoted by E who needs aceess to the bottleneck as a critical input in order to 
produce the final goods. 
Instead of a homogeneous product, consider the pricing problem of the 
incumbent supplying n different products. Following the analysis of Vickers 
(1997), the priee and marginal cost of product i are denoted by Pi and Ci 
respectively. The demands of products QI(PI),q2(P2),q3(P3), ... ,qn(Pn) are 
independent; and the inverse demand function is PII(Q). The total cost of 
producing all the products is C(QpQ2,Q3,. .. ,Q,). All activities exhibit constant 
retums to scale, exeept for a fixed cost F incurred in constructing the 
bottleneck. Assume one unit of the bottleneck is needed to produee one unit of 
a final product. Finally, denoted by a, the aceess charge is paid by the entrant 
for the aceess to the network. 
The optimal aceess charge a is derived together with the priees of the final 
goods. By construction, every customer is required to contribute to the 
recovery of the fixed costs. In order to reduce distortions, customers less 
price-sensitive are expected to contribute more; Le. the more elastic the 
demand for the final product is, the smaller the mark-up will be. As a result, 
the mark-ups over marginal costs are higher in "inelastic" groups. 
Under the Ramsey Pricing Rule, the goal is to maximize the sum of consumer 
welfare and total industry profits, subject to a break-even constraint for the 
incumbent. 
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Total revenue is: 
n 
R(p.q) = l>nqn(Pn) 
.=1 (3.1) 
The total surplus Îs: 
(3.2) 
The regulator is facing the problem of maximizing TS(p,q) subject to the 
constraÎnt that the profit equals to the fixed cost F: 
(3.3) 
The first-order conditions are (there are n first-order conditions): 
(3.4) 
Ri the partial derivative of total revenue with respect to qi 
Ci the partial derivative of total cost with respect to qi 
À the Lagrange multiplier 
According to Valletti & Estache (1998), the conditions could be rewritten as: 
(3.5) 
7]i the elasticity of demand for service i 
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Equation (3.5) indicates that the mark-ups over the marginal costs are 
inversely proportional to the elasticity of the demand for goods. As discuss 
before, because of the fixed costs, "first best" could not be achieved; instead, 
distortions such as the mark-ups were introdueed. The distortion is least 
damaging when mark-ups are set to be high in the markets with customers 
who are less priee sensitive; as it would allow cost recovering of the 
incumbent without affecting the consumer behavior too much. 
In particular, the recovery of fixed costs could be viewed as coming from 
three sources. Two sourees are accrued directly to the incumbent through his 
customers: one from the bottleneck segment denoted by b and the other from 
the competitive segment denoted by c. The third source cornes from the 
entrant denoted bye; and it is passed along to the incumbent via the access 
charge. Thus: 
From the incumbent: 
VI:; Co .. 1 1 
PI:; -1+,17]0 (3.6) 
Pc: -CD -Cc .ft 1 
=---
Pc: 1 + À 1Jc (3.7) 
From the entrant: 
(3.8) 
Since the entrant is a priee-taker, its priee P 6 reeeived from the additional 
unit produeed has to be equal to the co st of the additional unit (a + ce). From 
equation (3.8) we derive the optimal aceess priee: 
(3.9) 
Aceess priee = Direct cost of aceess + Modified Ramsey term 
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From equation (3.9), to ca1culate the aceess priee, the regulatory commissions 
would require information on the marginal cost of the bottleneck segment 
(c,,), the price of the services of the entrant ( Pe ), the elasticity of demand for 
serviees from the entrant (17
e
), and the value of the Lagrange multiplier (À, ). 
If the coefficient ~ equals to 0, this condition represent the situation under 
1 + À, 
competition. This indicates that the aceess is prieed equal to the incumbent's 
incremental costs incurred from giving aceess to the entrant. There is no 
monopoly rent embedded in the priee of the final good. As the coefficient 
approaches 1, the priee gets higher than the price of a competitive market thus 
less quantity would be sold. If the coefficient ~ equals to l, it represents 
1 + À, 
the situation of monopolistic price discrimination. 
3.2.3 The "Second Best" Allocation 
One might wonder why the Ramsey Prieing Rule sometimes produees 
outcomes similar as if the incumbent exerts the monopoly power. First of aIl, 
to set the record straight, no party under Ramsey Pricing Rule possesses 
monopoly power. The higher than marginal cost aceess priee is strietly result 
from the regulator maximizing the total profits and social welfare subject to 
the constraint of making the incumbent breaking even. The main purpose of 
employing Ramsey pricing is to promote as weil as to protect the incumbent 
for making an investment that creates economies of scale. 
The Ramsey Pricing Rule aims at making sure that the proper goods and 
serviees are provided, and creates as small distortions as possible from the 
"first best" allocations. Imagine that the customers of the entrant are not 
particularly priee responsive. It is thus possible to charge them a relatively 
high priee. Part of such high priee is passed on to the incumbent via a high 
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aceess charge. This is in the interest of the society as a whole because it 
allows other priees to be redueed without violating the incumbent's budget 
constraint. For example, if consumers of the incumbent are priee sensitive, 
they would be charged a low final priee; so that their consumption is not 
significantly distorted. Henee as the "second best", the equilibrium under 
Ramsey Pricing Rule is in between the ordinary monopoly and perfect 
competition. 
3.2.4 Possible Implementation Difficulties 
The main problem encountered in the implementation of the Ramsey Pricing 
Rule is that it suffers from very demanding information gathering: the 
incumbent's cost and production function as weil as the different e1asticties of 
demand of the consumers are required to be known. Even if ail the variables 
were measureable, the regulators may still be constrained by asymmetric 
information as the firms are more informed on the characteristics of the cost 
and demand conditions than the regulators. 
Furthermore, the mark-ups could potentially drive the customers with inelastic 
demand substituting away from the existing products and seeking for 
alternatives. In this case, it is a "Iose-Iose situation" for both of the incumbent 
and the entrants as their market shrinks, which in turn implies lower demand 
and revenue. 
Moreover, white attaining a desirable level of efficiency, the Ramsey Pricing 
Rule typically overlooks equity considerations. After ail, individuals with 
relatively inelastic demand are people who find the product most essential. As 
a result, this income distribution problem often causes the regulators political 
and legal difficulties in putting the Ramsey aceess charge into practice. 
Finally, priee discrimination is typically viewed as a byproduct of Ramsey 
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Prieing Rule and is sometimes accused as an illegal or socially undesirable 
exploitation of monopoly power, which may in turn cause anti-trust offence 
under certain circumstances. 
3.3 The Global Priee Cap: (GPC) 
3.3.1 General Information 
Suppose that the Ramsey Prieing Rule were chosen despite of ail the 
complexities; it is expected that the regulations would be followed c10sely by 
the firms regardless of the ever changing industry conditions. To avoid sticky 
priees and the associated destruction on business viability, as weil as to exploit 
the decentralized and firm-specifie information, a pricing discretion could be 
given to the firm. However, it is critieal for the regulators to effectively 
manage the firms' freedom over their priees. 
A Global Price Cap on the firm's product range is proposed by J.J. Laffont and 
J. Tirole (1996) to effectively influence and constrain the exercise of pricing 
discretion of the firms. The Global Priee Cap is designed to attain the "second 
best" effieiency by a decentralized implementation of the Ramsey Pricing 
Rule. 
In general, the price cap imposed on the incumbent is determined in reference 
to a weighted average of the prices for a "basket" of products and services 
(from the incumbent's point of view, the network is one of its 
services/products that could be sold to potential entrants thus would be 
inc1uded in the computation of the cap). For ex ample, in the 
telecommunication industry, a "basket" could be composed of telephony, fax, 
internet, voicemail services as weil as the local network and exchange. Under 
this regime, if the weights were proportional to the forecasted quantities sold 
and if the incumbent had knowledge of his cost function, the Ramsey structure 
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would be the incumbent's profit maximizing vector of priees. 
3.3.2 The Logic of the Global Price Cap 
To be "Global", the priee cap is applied to just one "basket" assembling ail the 
products and services required to be controlled. In the following analysis, i is 
used to indicate the specific product or service in referenee to a weighted 
average of the priees included in the "basket". The associated weighted priee 
value WiPi of product i is just the cross-product between the weight wi and 
the priee Pi 
Suppose that there are n products and services in one "basket", rather than 
fixing the priees explicitly, a cap P is defined by the regulator. Consequently, 
the priees could be free\y chosen by the owner of the basket as long as the 
constraint "'1P1 + "''Z Pz 1 --- + "'a Pa 1 --- 1 "'nPn ~ fi is respected, in 
particular, the term WaPa denotes the weighted priee value of the network. 
This pricing scheme encourages the incumbent to maximize its profits by 
properly designing the price structures and adapting effective cost-reduction 
strategies. Accordingly, firms would emphasize more on optimal effort, 
operational efficiency, and technological advaneement. 
In order to understand exactly how the Ramsey priees could be indueed via 
imposing a Global Priee Cap, let us consider a simple problem of a non-
regulated incumbent with the threat of entry(s). By setting a priee cap P, the 
regulators aim to maximize the sum of consumer surplus and total industry 
profits. 
The firrn henee faees the following problem: 
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Max: 
Subject to: 
Suppose that the priees of other serviees are not affected by changes in the 
priees of one given service (aapX = 0). Using the Lagrange method, the first 
Py 
order conditions are: 
Tf - profit of the incumbent 
y ~ Lagrange multiplier 
When pj is increased by a unit, Wi units of consumer surplus would be lost 
(here Wj is interpreted as representing the predieted demand of good O. From 
this analysis we could see that under the Glôbal Priee Cap, firm not only 
achieves pricing flexibility but also internalizes the consumer surplus in 
proportion to the weights set in the cap. In other words, sinee the incumbent 
receives a portion of the benefit Wj , while pricing the different products and 
services, it creates minimum distortion to the total social welfare. 
3.3.3 The Advantages of the Global Priee Cap 
Not necessarily knowing the firm-specific information requested under the 
Ramsey Pricing Rule, the regulator could induee the firm to achieve the 
"second best" allocation by imposing a Global Priee Cap. In order to respect 
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the cap, the firm will set the priees of the basket based on its private 
information such as the demand and cost structures as weil as the consumer 
preferences. 
Generally, there is no need for the regulators to measure the demand 
elasticities of different groups of customers. The weights are set by the 
regulators, and are exogenous and proportional to the predieted quantity sold 
of products and services (including the network access). To keep the price cap 
updated, the regulators may constantly monitor and verify the inflation rate 
benchmarks such as the Consumer Prices Index (CPI). 
The important task left for the incumbent is to carefully design its priees to 
maximize the profit while respecting the Global Priee Cap: it will set the 
priees of the basket based on its private information such as the demand and 
cost structures as weil as the consumer preferences. 
3.4 The Cost-Based Pricing: Backward-Looking and Forward-Looking 
3.4.1 General Information 
To start with, the sophisticated "first best" ECPR is not very much feasible. 
Furthermore it is impossible for the regulators to capture aIl the competitive 
and demand related information for applying Ramsey Pricing Rule. Moreover, 
to correctly predict the output level for setting the optimal weights for the 
price cap index is also a difficult and costly process. Consequently, the Cost-
based Pricing Rule is often suggested and implemented in literatures and real 
practice. Taking the importance of both productive and aIlocative efficiency 
into consideration, instead of marginal costs, regulators typicaIly set access 
prices at average total costs or the long-term incremental costs of the service 
provided, as these cost measures allow for reasonable retum on initial 
investments. For example, the FuIly Distributed Cost (FDC) and Long Run 
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Average Incrementai Cost (LRAIC) are widely used around the worid. 
One generalized formula for access charge based on average pricing is: 
F 
aap = Cdm f- Q 
Cdm 
F 
Q 
Access charge based on average pricing 
Incumbent's direct marginal cost from giving access to the 
entrantes) 
Incumbent's fixed cost which could be interpreted as the set 
up cost of the network or sorne other costs deriving from 
social obligations 
Total quantity of the final good 
According to Armstrong (2002), one of the main benefits of employing Cost-
based Pricing is its relatively simple implementation as only the cost of the 
network is needed to be estimated. There is no further information required on 
the characteristics of demand or the potential entrants. AIso, when 
disregarding the efficiency concems, this is the only policy gives the entrants 
a c\ear signal on whether to lease or duplicate the network when bypass is 
possible. Moreover, the Cost-based Pricing Rule is fair and non-
discriminatory and does not depend on the rivais' usage of the network; thus 
the entrants will not be offered with different terms. In addition, the Cost-
based Pricing Rule compensates the incumbent for undertaking the project 
early. If the incumbent were to wait for the initial outlay to fall, it may not 
enjoy as high profit as before. In other words, higher investment co st means 
higher access charge; thus higher cash inflow after the network has been built. 
This brings about a critical issue: how to measure the costs? What kind of 
1 
valuation and depreciation method is appropriate? Should the regulator use 
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historical costs in accordanee with most of the accounting policies7 ; or should 
it choose the less reliable but more relevant market value reflecting the CUITent 
replacement costs? In other words, should the regulator adopt the "backward-
looking cost rules" and value the network at the initial investment cost; or 
should it adopt the "forward-Iooking cost rules" and value the network at 
present value to reflect its CUITent market price? 
A number of regulatory commissions mandate historical costs as the basis for 
cost accounting because historical values are more reliable; as they are readily 
available and could be easily verified. Furthermore, according to the analysis 
conducted by Guthrie et al. (2006), the incumbent bearing the iITeversibility 
nature of its investment, in a world of uneertainties, would invest earlier under 
a backward than forward-Iooking cost rule and will le ad to a higher total 
welfare. 
Nevertheless, historical costs bear sorne obvious disadvantages. For example, 
they may distort decisions when technology is evolving rapidly. Also 
incumbents with high historical costs will be able to charge higher prices no 
matter whether they are efficient or not. However, when determining optimal 
aceess priees, the potential entrant should not be responsible for the high costs 
of the incumbent just because the incumbent invested at the time when costs 
were high. 
In terms of the forward-Iooking cost-based ru le , it is based on the estimated 
CUITent costs of re-constructing the network. In particular, this pricing scheme 
weil rewards efficient incumbents' sound investment choices. In addition, 
sinee forward-Iooking rule evaluates the replacement cost by incorporating the 
latest technology available, it reflects the most CUITent market conditions and 
7 Both the U.S. and Canadian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) regulate most 
of the Exed assets to be valued at their historical costs;' only certain assets such as marketable 
securities could be valued under current priees. 
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thus is helpful for both the incumbent and the entrant to make sound 
investment and production decision. 
However, as the market price fluctuates, the access price under the forward-
looking cost-based rule diverges from its initial value which in tum creates 
additional uncertainties and risks to the incumbent. 
Overall, regardless of the accounting methods, there are still sorne general 
criticisms on the cost-based access pricing rule. For example, since the cost-
based pricing rule does not employ marginal cost to set the access price, it is 
often criticized on the lacking of economic efficiency. Additionally, there is 
not yet a generally acceptable allocation methodology that could be 
implemented to optimally divide the fixed cost into units. 
3.4.2 The US Experience: the Telecommunication Industry 
With the passing of the Telecommunication Act of 1996, authorizing the 
competitors to lease a part of incumbent's network, the US Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) mandated the TELRIC89 method to give 
the potential entrants ready and economical access. In essence, it is a forward-
looking cost-based method for determining the fees at which the entrants need 
to pay for using the network. According to the TELRIC, the price is 
determined based on the costs of building an efficient network using the best 
available technology rather than the actual cost of the incumbent's network. It 
is understood that the value of the capital investment falls as the time passes 
since it requires more maintenance and repair. It is also expected to eventually 
become obsolete as newer and better technologies are introduced and adopted. 
Therefore, the TELRIC method used to determine the capital costs takes the 
H TELRIC: Total Element Long Run Incrementai Cast 
9 Sometimes it is referred as the TSLRIC: Total Service Long Run Incrementai Cost. The 
incremental costs equal marginal costs for small output changes but may differ substantially if it 
involves large output changes up to the entÎre services. 
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effects of depreciation and obsolescence into account. 
Although the FCC policy allows for the recovery of the cost of investment as 
weil as variable costs of providing the services over the economic lifetime of 
the investment; as discussed in Hausman (1999), it fails to take notice of the 
irreversibility and the according risks of the initial capital outlay. As a result, it 
causes underestimation of the network investments which in tum could lead to 
less innovation and untimely investment. 
3.4.3 The Pricing Tools 
As mentioned in section 3.3, constraints are helpful for retaining sorne 
regulatory control in case the incumbent is given too much freedom to set the 
access prices. For example, a ceiling could be implemented to pre vent the 
incumbent from exploiting its market power by requesting excessively high 
access prices. According to Vogelsang (2003), the average stand-alone costs of 
a (hypothetical) whole-sale operator could be an appropriate upper limit for 
access prices charged by an intergraded incumbent under the Cost-based 
Pricing Rule. This holds because pricing above stand-al one costs would be 
unsustainable under (hypothetical) competitive conditions. Conversely, a floor 
is often used to prevent aggressive pricing with a predatory intention. 
Vogelsang (2003) proposed the lower limit to be average incremental costs or 
short run marginal costs. If the access price set under the Cost-based Pricing 
Rule is lower than it, the access service would be cross subsidized. 
3.5 A Comparison of the Rules 
The objective of the ECPR is to allow efficient entry under the assumption of 
no monopoly rents embedded in the price of the final products. In contrast, the 
Ramsey Pricing Rule aims for global efficiency whi1e attaining the economies 
of scale. To avoid the obvious difficulties of information gathering associated 
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with the above-mentioned two rules, the Global Price Cap is employed as an 
alternative path of achieving the "second best" efficiency. However, the 
economies of sc ale often imply that marginal cost pricing, absent subsidy, will 
not allow the incumbent to break even. Instead, for the ease of 
implementation, the Cost-based Access Pricing rule is typically mandated by 
the regulators around the world. 
One of the main criticisms of the ECPR is that, under this pricing scheme, if 
the incumbent was earning inappropriately high profits in the first place, the 
monopoly rent will be continually earned even with the presence of the 
entrant. Furthermore, since the problem of asymmetric information between 
the firm and the regulatory commission has not been solved, as both the 
ECPR and the Ramsey pricing rule require detailed information on the 
demand and competition interactions, they are still theoretical and far from 
actual implementation. Moreover, although the implementation of a Global 
Price Cap could greatly eliminate the asymmetric information problems, it 
will only manage to approximate the desirable results. Last but not least, the 
access prices determined under the Cost-based Pricing Rule might give 
investors not sufficient incentive, as it removes the incumbent's advantages of 
being the first moyer in the market, while leaves it with uncovered downward 
risks (as the incumbent still needs to support the network even if the market 
condition is undesirable). 
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4 THE REAL OPTION APPROACH 
4.1 Overview 
The issue of asymmetric risk sharing between the incumbent and the entrants 
has surfaced in the literature concerning the linkage between the current 
access prieing policies, the uncertainty, the irreversibility, and the incentives 
for investments. It arises from the possibility that the entrant has the option of 
accessing the incumbent's facilities on a short-term basis. Consequently, if 
market conditions for the final goods deteriorate, the entrant can exit the 
market but the incumbent still has to support the investment. In this case, a 
free "exit option10", is given to the entrant. AIso, if a contract were to be 
signed for granting the network access, the contract covering shorter period of 
time would have higher priees because comparing to a long-term contract, a 
short-term one involves less uncertainty. 
In general, the access priee set under the previously discussed "classieal" 
access prieing rules could not adequately compensate the incumbent for the 
risk taken by investing irreversibly in an uncertain market. Economic analysis 
of irreversible investment under uncertainty implies that due to the sunk cos t, 
for a project to be undertaken, it typically is expected to offer returns weIl 
above the "breakeven". Therefore, if the "classieal" access prieing rules were 
to be used, the entrants would be subsidized. 
4.2 Sorne Critical Concepts 
4.2.1 General Information 
The following analysis considers a single firm that has an initial monopoly 
10 Since the option can be exercised at any time before the "expiration" date, it is equivalent ta an 
American put option 
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over a network construction opportunity. By committing to take on the 
investment, the firm constructs a network. The access to the network could be 
granted to its competitors. Each competitor then has the choice of developing 
its own network (bypassing) or renting the existing facilities. 
The main focus is not only to incorporate the roIe of investment, and maintain 
the supply of final goods and services but also to consider the irreversible 
nature of the investment and the effects of the uncertainty and f1exibility on 
the investment decision. There are costs and benefits associated with building 
a network, since it requires significant upfront capital outlay but the benefits 
carry tremendous uncertainty. This sometimes creates an incentive to defer the 
commitment of the irreversibIe investments. On the other hand, the 
construction of a network could possibly make the firm a natural monopoly of 
the industry. 
When firms face a choice of whether to take on the investment, it is 
considered as holding a real option. Specifically, it is an "option to grow", 
which involves investing in an initial market, product line or technology to 
develop a platform for future growth opportunities. This is common in the 
infrastructure projects, which demand high initial capital outlays with no 
immediate retums. For example, the natural gas transmission companies often 
spend considerable resources to develop networks of pipelines without 
receiving positive cash f10ws during the initial construction period, and only 
to target possible future opportunities of delivering natural gas when the 
network is built. 
This "option to grow" is in fact a compound option; that is, option(s) on 
option(s). Each phase of the project is modeled by one or more financial 
options. The value of an earlier option is affected by the value of the options 
later in the investment sequence. They interact with each other, so their 
combined value may differ from the sum of their separate value. 
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The value of a network depends on how it is operated and licensed and most 
importantly on the ever changing market condition. Therefore, the rules 
governing the investment decisions in network development must be 
conditioned on the irreversibility of the investment, the uncertainties of the 
project and the according management flexibilities. 
4.2.2 The Sources of Uncertainty 
In adynamie world, market condition, technology innovation, factor prices 
and many other parameters of interest to a company are subject to uncertainty. 
Among the above mentioned factors, the main source of uncertainty is the 
market demand for final goods and services, which in turn could bring about 
significant impact on the cash flow, project evaluation, and profitability of the 
enterprise. 
Uncertainty can make a substantial difference in determining the access 
prices. The value of the network construction project evolves according to the 
random processes of several critical variables; hence the sources of 
u ncertai nt y could be multiple. Variables such as the quantity and price of the 
goods and services to be delivered, the input priees, the possible technologie al 
innovations, the legal and environmental aspects of the project, and the 
regulation governing the production activities could all play a role in 
influencing the value of the investment. 
4.2.3 The Points of Flexibility 
When holding a real option of building a network facility, depending on the 
investment and market conditions, the incumbent has the flexibilities to delay 
the investment, to pause the project of several phases, to increase or contract 
the goods and services provided temporarily by controlling both its own and 
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the leasee's usage of the network, to postpone the decision of future growth to 
the next period if possible or simply abandon the project, and so on. 
On the other hand, the entrant has the flexibility to choose when (the timing of 
entry) and how (leasing the facilities or bypassing) to obtain the access of the 
network for transferring its goods and services as weil as when to stop having 
the access following the ever changing market conditions. 
4.2.4 The Significance of Irreversibility 
If the decision is reversible, one can always recover the input of funds and 
there is no or minimal cost to modify or even annul the investment when 
circumstances change. In reality, however, perfect reversibility does not exist; 
therefore it is considered as a sunk cost. This irreversible co st is a significant 
portion of the total co st of many public utilities projects and plays a critical 
role in influencing the market structures, the timely investments, as weil as the 
effective and efficient resource allocations. 
Once the investment is made, the firm looses the opportunity to delay the 
project further in waiting for better market conditions. However this 
opportunity cost has yet been commonly acknowledged by the public in 
making the pricing decisions. Comparing to the entrants leasing the facilities 
to deliver their goods and services, the incumbent does not have the 
convenience to withdraw from using the network when it is not profitable. 
While the incumbent assumes the full ownership and receives benefit from it, 
it is also responsible for the possible burden of the network. Thus the 
incumbent should be compensated for undertaking an irreversible investment. 
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4.2.5 The Optimal Access Price 
Under uncertainty and irreversibility, it is difficult to maintain incentives for 
the investors by relying on sorne of the above-mentioned "classical" access 
pricing schemes because it could possibly lead to under-investment or 
undesirable delay of investment. For example, if the access price is too low 
thus makes it impossible to coyer the irreversible sunk costs, the network 
provider will not have the incentive to invest in new or maintain the existing 
network. Therefore, it decreases future social welfare by creating unnecessary 
delays in the introduction of socially desirable goods and/or by reducing the 
supply of future final goods and services. When designing the proper access 
pricing policy, the regulator should take ail of these aspects into account. 
Ideally, an optimal access price should be able to reward the network provider 
for undertaking the uncertain and irreversible investment. 
4.2.6 The Evaluation of Real Options 
4.2.6.1 Options of lncumbent 
Firms of certain industries such as telecommunication companies, railway 
opera tors, electric power generation and transmission companies, as weil as 
the natural gas production and transmission companies could expand their 
operation via building a new network to deliver their products and services. 
Before taking on the project, managers normally will make sorne thorough 
analyses to evaluate the viability of the project by determining the market 
condition, the infrastructural and financial requirements, as weil as any 
potential legal and environmental constraints. 
The value of the decision to expand its operation now or de fer the network 
construction to a future date is equivalent to an American cali option with an 
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exercise priee equal to the required investment. The manager will compare the 
present value St of the expanded project with the investment cost K and he will 
decide to invest if SI ~ K. If no t, the manager has the option to defer an 
investment up to a date T in the future. In any moment from now until that 
date T , he will decide whether or not to invest, contingent on the changing 
market conditions. For a date tE [0, T], he will compare the cost of investment 
with the present value of the project. The payoff will be max(SI - K,O) should 
the manager choose to invest at t. 
If market conditions become worse than initially expected, managers can 
decide to contract by operating below capacity and temporarily suspending 
the further development of project to save the investment outlays. If the 
manager had planned to spend K dollars in investments at any time tE [0, T], 
the option to contract will save the company KE . If SI represents the value of 
the project lost with contraction, the payoff will then be max(K - SI'0). 
Generally, the option to contract is analogous to an American put option. 
4.2.6.2 Options of Entrant 
If the market dec1ines severely, the entrant might decide to stop leasing the 
network. For example, if a product is replaced because of a technological 
innovation, its demand will sharply drop. Suppose that discontinuing its 
aceess of the network will cost the entrant K. If SI represents the value of the 
project at time t, abandoning it will cost SI' The payoff is then max(K - SI'0) . 
Therefore, abandoning a project could be evaluated as equivalent to an 
American put option. 
Suppose that a natural gas substitute is subsequently discovered with less 
production and transportation costs, as a result, the demand and priee for 
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natural gas will drop significantly. In this case, the manager might choose to 
permanently abandon the project in exchange for a salvage value of K. 
4.3 The Framework: With and Without the Threat of Entry 
Operating the network and only utilizing it for the sole purpose of producing 
its own goods and services is materially different from bearing the possibility 
of granting its competitors with access to a part of the network. In the latter 
case, the incumbent is expected to suffer financially due to the entry of the 
rival because of a reduced market share. Since the firm's investment decision 
is largely influenced by the threat of entry, it is then assumed that the value of 
the network project with the possibilities of e~try is different from the one 
without. 
By undertaking the project, the incumbent forgoes the value of the "option of 
waiting to invest", therefore when estimating the access priees, the incumbent 
is expected to be compensated for not only a part of the initial investment of 
building the physical network but also the 10st value of the "option of waiting 
to invest." The focus should be to set the access price considering the risk 
taken and the according value forgone by the incumbent so the network will 
be built in timely fashion and the access will be granted following the demand 
of the entrant. 
4.3.1 General Information 
The following analyses of firm's investment decision are under two possible 
scenarios: 1) there is no threat of entry: the incumbent is the sole user of the 
network; and 2) the incumbent must readily grant access to the entrant on 
demand: there are possibly two users of the network. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that the incumbent has an obligation to serve the final good's market. 
x 
p 
a 
r 
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Cost of building the network unit (infinite life with no 
depreciation) 
Price of the final good (suppose that only one homogeneous good 
is produeed): it evolves stochastically through time. Sinee priees 
of the final goods are assumed to be positive, we let P follow a 
process of Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) with drift to 
reflect the stochastic innovations as weIl as any long-term trend 
in priee evolution: 
d'Pt = Il Pt. dt + aprdzr 
The parameter j.l is the drift, the expected rate of priee growth; 
U is the diffusion, the standard deviation of dPt ; it represents the 
Pt 
short-term variability of the priee. The term dZ t is the increment 
of a Weiner proeess, whieh may be interpreted as the differenee 
of Zr+n - Zr for sorne small positive h. 
The incumbent' s cost of producing the final good 
The entrant' s cost of producing the final good 
The increment~l cost of providing the aceess 
The aceess priee; one unit of access is required as an input to 
supply one unit of the final good. 
The entrant' s share of the network. 
Risk less interest rate 
4.3.1.1 The Computational Methodologies 
There are in general four basic computational methodologies for assessing 
real option values: closed-form analytic solutions, lattiee or tree models, 
simulation models, and numerical solutions to partial differential equations. 
Closed-form anal y tic solutions are the best approach to use when the variables 
are measureable and obtainable. However, often there are several critical 
variables in a formula, and most of the times it is too complicated a task to 
properly identify and collect aIl variables to work out the real option value. 
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Also, it would be a problem for simulation models. Closed-form is the best 
approach when the solutions for the differential equations are known. 
For example, there are five drivers in the Black-Scholes formulas for 
European put and cali options: present value of a project's operating assets to 
be acquired which is analogous to the "stock price" of the Black-Scholes 
financial option model; the expenditure required to acquire the project assets 
to the "exercise priee"; the length of time the decision may be deferred to the 
"time to expiration"; the time value of money to the "risk~free rate of retum"; 
and the riskiness of the project as sets to the "variance of retums on stock" 
(Luehrman, 1998). In the case of network access valuation, because of the 
often unstable technological, economical, and politieal environment as weil as 
the unpredietable nature of the local regulations goveming the network 
industry; accurately collecting five drivers at once js a challenging task. 
Lattice or tree models are useful because the y are easy to understand and work 
weil for both American and European options. In the case of only one risk 
driver, this technique can be easily applied on a spreadsheet, where one axis is 
time and the other is the price level or value of the underlying risk driver. 
Their complication arises when multiple risk drivers are at presence. Instead 
of a generic spreadsheet, a programming language such as Matlab is required. 
Considering the complexity of the access prieing problem and the associated 
multiple risk drivers, it is advised to adopt a programming language to 
compute the optimal trigger strategy and option value by using the backward 
recursion, which is also known as dynamie programming. 
Simulation models implement a forward approach, with the underlying as set 
starting at a fixed price and undergoing random increments. It can be 
efficiently used to estimate the conditional expected payoffs and continuation 
values. Moreover, simulation can easily handle multiple risk drivers and 
complex processes, which is a distinct advantage over the lattice approach. To 
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apply the real option valuation technique to evaluate the optimal aceess priee, 
"Monte Carlo" approach is often used. It simulates many sample paths and 
finds the solution for each replication. The Monte Carlo simulation makes a 
draw from the underlying stochastic distribution to determine the economic 
outcome. This proeedure is repeated many times. The random distribution of 
the outcome is given from the significant number of times that the model is 
run, each time with a different random set of inputs that are drawn randomly 
from the same underlying distribution. 
Numerical solutions to differential equations are generally useful in academie 
real option settings. Sinee the focus of this study is to deterrnine the proper 
timing of building the network under di ffere nt circumstanees; that is to 
characterise the impact of aceess priee on the ineentives to invest in network 
development, the numerieal solutions to differential equations will be 
employed in the following analyses. 
Nevertheless, sinee it is not cost effective to build a custom partial differential 
equation for every network aceess pricing problem; the lattiee models and 
simulation models are often implemented in real practiee. 
4.3.2 The Value of the Network: Without the Threat of Entry 
Let us first examine the investment opportunity of creating a network without 
the threat of entry. In other words, the owner of the network is not under the 
regulatory pressure to grant access to any of the competitors. 
The firrn could make a capital outlay of X to construct a network which is 
expected to generate cash flows in the future continuously. Thus undertaking 
the project has an expected present value of Vl10 access , whieh depends on 
the priee of the final good that varies stochastieally following a GBM. 
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(4.1) 
When the incumbent is the sole supplier of the final goods and services, it 
faces no risk of having to give access. The profit of the incumbent at time t 
is: 
(4.2) 
When the CUITent price is equal to PD, the value of the (existing) network to 
the incumbent without access is equal to: 
Vf(no access) (PlO) = E(fJOfoog [(Pit - clI - clN ()e] t(-rt) dtlplO = PlO 1 J J 
(4.3) 
Before making the investment, it is as if the firm is holding an "option to 
invest". The value of this option is the difference between the expected 
present value of the investment and the actual investment outlay. There is a 
critical value PT: • At Ume t , the company will invest if Pt i:! PT: and will delay 
the investment if Pt < P7:. The objective of the incumbent is to choose the 
optimal investment date (r) in order to maximize the expected present value 
of the investment. 
The value of the "option to invest" is equal to: 
F(P,O) = mUTet E [O. """ri )E[ ~ (Vf(no access) (P.O X [le) f(-rt) ~ 1 PlO = PlO] 
(4.4) 
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F (PD) ;: The value of the "option to invest" at time 0 
T _ The time the investment will be made 
Assume that during the "waiting period", as F(p) yields no cash flow, the only 
return is from the capital appreciation at the risk-free discount rate: 
By Ito's Lemma: 
From equation (4.3): 
From equation (4.8): 
rFrl.t = RViF) 
df l d 2 F 
:iF = -c1p + ---CtlpP dp 2 dp2 
= J,lzp2(dt)2 + 2J,lop 2 dtdEt + o2JPdBt 2 
= a 2 p2it 
Take expectations, also since E[dBr.l = () : 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
(4.10) 
Substitute equation (4.5) into (4.10) then divide the result by dt to find the 
differential equation, (also referred to as the Bellman's equation): 
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(4.11) 
Substitute J1 = r - Ô , where 8 is considered as a dividend yield or an 
opportunity cost; equation (4.11) could be written as: 
1 dlF d~ 
_u'Jp'J -- + (r - 8)p-' - rF = 0 
2 dp'J dt} (4.12) 
The value of the "option to invest" F(p) must satisfy the following boundary 
conditions: 
HmF(p) = 0 
p ... o (4.13) 
(4.14) 
Ff(P') = 1 (4.15) 
Condition (4.13) implies that when priee is zero, the project investment has no 
value. Condition (4.14) indicates that at the time the investment is made, the 
payoff of the project is p. -x . Condition (4.15) ensures smoothness and 
continuity of the solution. 
The solution to the differential equation is (for detailed explanation please 
refer to Appendix A): 
(4.16) 
The parameter CI is a constant to be deterrnined; and {JI is a known constant 
that depends on the coefficients of the differential equation. 
(4.17) 
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(4.18) 
From the above-mentioned boundary condition, the price level at which is 
optimal for the incumbent to invest is: 
(4.19) 
With: 
(4.20) 
'(4.21) 
4.3.3 The Value of the Network: With the Threat of Entry 
Assume that before making an investment to build a network, the incumbent 1 
is regulated to give access to the entrant E at the access price a. 
4.3.3.1 A Case Study: the Telecommunication Industry of Canada 
In real practice, a great portion of access pricing rules mandated by the 
regulatory commissions are based on incremental costs incorporating a mark-
up that makes allowance for the other costs of the access provider. The mark-
up may be calibrated by the regulators tailored to individual cases, or it could 
be left to the discretion of an incumbent but with certain restrictions such as a 
price cap for eliminating predatory or excessive pricing. 
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Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) 
recentlyll ruled out the possibility of adopting a market-based approach of 
pricing essential services, instead, the cost-based approach based on the 
associated prospective incremental costs (phase II costl2) plus a mark-up is 
mandated for the Canadian telecommunication industry. A mark-up of 15%13 
is generally agreed upon by the associated parties. Let us now examine the 
Canadian telecommunication industry and its according access pricing 
policies. 
In the following paragraphs, the access pricing under Canadian legislation will 
be compared to the access price under the ECPR, the pricing ru le that 
produces the "first best" allocation. 
With the 15% mark-up the access price mandated by the CRTC is: 
aCanadian = c.v(1 + ÛJ), W = 0.15 (4.22) 
11 Please refer to Telecom Decision CRTC 2008-17 (Revised rej.,>ulatory framework for wholesale 
services and definition of essential service) issued on 3 March 2008 
12 In Telecom Decision 79-16, the Commission defined the resources associated with the 
provision of a new product/service under four categories. (1) The direct resources are the major 
additional resource quantities to provide a service over the study period. They consist of those 
uruts of management, labour, plant, equipment, material, and supplies wruch can be ~eadily 
identified and quantified. (2) The indirect resources are generally minor in nature and are those 
resources that can be readily identified in support of the direct resources. (3) The variable 
common (VC) resources are those remaining resources where the quantities of or payments for 
the resources are variable with the scale of operations of wruch the service represents a portion. 
The costs associated with these resources include proportions of the variable costs of ail 
operations involved in providing a service which are not identified and estimated as direct or 
indirect costs. (4)The fixed common (FC) resources primarily consist of plant and equipment 
wruch are employed to provide the service but the cost of wruch will not vary over the life of the 
serVlce. 
The costs of the resources used for a new product/service within the f1!st three categories are to 
be attributed to the new product/ service and are referred to in trus Decision as causal costs or 
Phase II costs and, if expenses, as causal expenses or Phase II expenses. 
13 Instead of 15%, the mark-up for Télébec and TCC in its operating territory of Quebec is 25%. 
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Denote the access price under the ECPR as aECPR. By definition, the access 
price :LECPR leaves the incumbent indifferent between giving access or not. 
Consequently, if the regulator were to choose to implement the ECPR, it 
should have: 
(4.23) 
The access priee mandated by the CRTC will achieve the "first best" 
allocation, if and only if GCanadian = CECPR; that is 1.15cN = p~ - Cl. 
However, since it is assumed that p r. undergoes a GBM, the price of the final 
goods is time-independent and will vary stochastically. Thus, under the CRTC 
regulation, with this cost-based fixed access scheme, a c1ear cali to entry or 
exit will be automatically signaled to the entrant. Since the entrant has the 
option to interrupt the incumbent's production when profitable and withdraw 
its presence when the net revenue is negative; the value of entrant accessing 
the network is always positive. If the mark-ups are insufficient, the incumbent 
might choose to deteriorate access quality or exclude rivais. In conclusion, 
under the CRTC regulation, there are insufficient incentives provided for 
optimal investment, innovation and competition. 
4.3.3.2 A General Expression 
Practically, instead of gathering information on marginal costs and demand, 
the cost-based access charges with a possible mark-up have come to prevail 
worldwide. The regulatory commissions often arbitrarily decide what portion 
of the incumbent's total costs of the network could be covered. Under most of 
the regulations, the access priee typically depends on forward looking 
incremental costs. Also, the fixed charge is commonly incorporated into the 
determination. For example, in the telecommunication industry, the "Long 
Run Incrementai Cost (LRIC)" and the "Total Element Long Run Incrementai 
Cost (TELRIC)" are adopted by Australia and the United States respectively. 
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Furthermore, in the United Kingdom, the aceess priee is regulated to be 
proportional to the fixed co st. 
In the following analysis, the aceess priee is set to be in proportion to the 
incumbent's total costs (inc1uding both incremental costs and the fixed costs) 
associated with the network: 
a = m(cN +1'X) 
ln A parameter arbitrarily chosen by the regulator to arrive at an 
appropriate aceess priee; m > 0 
To begin, suppose that the entrant can freely enter and exit the market at no 
co st. The incumbent must grant access to the entrant at a priee of a . The 
entrant is able to lease an exogenously determined proportion qJ.E E (~0,1] 
of the network. 
Following the analysis of Boyer, Gravel, & Lasserre (2008), the profit 
function of the incumbent is: 
{ P~ -Cl -CN if Pt < c" + a ilI = qE(a - cv) + (1- qE)(Pt -Cl -:.:.'.1) if Pt > CE + a 
(4.22) 
Under the cost-based aceess prieing rule, when the current priee is equal to PD, 
the value of the network to the incumbent is: 
(4.23) 
Equation (4.23) needs to satisfy the Bellman equation. The differential 
equation for the value of the project is: 
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(4.24) 
The term 1[r(P} is defined differently when P < cE .. a and 
when P > CE + a . Therefore we solve the equation separately for the two 
regions and examine the solutions at the point where P - CE + a . 
In this case, the value of the network cou Id be expressed as: 
(4.25) 
The potential investor of a network maximizes the expected present value of 
the investment by choosing the optimal investment time r, . Since the priee 
tluctuates stochastically and the value of the network to the incumbent is 
characterized by different equations when P ~ CF! + a . We now define the 
region where P > CE + a as U , and the region where P < CE + a as L . 
The "option of waiting to invest" has a value of: 
(4.26) 
It also must satisfy the Bellman equation: 
1/2 aTZ p T2 IF ,U (p)1 i- + J.l IF ,U (p)1 T' - rF ,U (P) = 0 
(4.27) 
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(4.28) 
The solution is (for more information, please refer to Appendix B): 
(4.29) 
To find the priee level Pu at which it is optimal for the incumbent to invest, 
solve the system: 
This gives equation of PlI: 
«(f1 - (f:)(pü)""z + ((f1 - l)P"'(1 r- fla) -
(f1 [(1 -qE;)t(cJ1 +~N) - qe(a - eN) + xl = 0 
(4.30) 
(4.31 ) 
(4.32) 
Now suppose that the incumbent invests in the region L wherep < CE + a . 
By solving the system: 
(4.33) 
(4.34) 
The optimal pi is: 
Pi. = ~1 le,v + c, + ,X] 
<1'1 -
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(4.35) 
When the price of the final products is sma1\er than the sum of the entrant's 
cost of production and the access priee (P < C/j 1 a ), the optimal investment 
thresholds with and without the threat of entry are identical (P Î. = p.). This 
observation makes economic sense because when p < CF + a , the entrant' s 
revenue is simply not enough to cover its costs. Although under regulation, 
the incumbent has to grant aceess on demand; its competitors wi1\ not enter 
the market till the priee reaches that level that could cover ail its costs. 
4.2.3.3 The Possible Investment Decisions 
Denote the priee at time t as Pt:, and the priee at whieh the entrant finds it 
profitable to take the aceess of the network as P, where P = CE + a. In 
summary, at t , the priee could fa1\ within four possible regions relevant to the 
incumbent in making an investment decision. 
In the first region, fî '> P. t'> P!., the competitors will not demand for access 
since the prospective revenue simply could not cover both its production and 
access costs. On the other hand, the incumbent may find it profitable to 
develop the network without sharing with its rivais. Rence, an investment will 
be made in building the network. 
In the second region, fi> PL > Pt, not only the potential entrant will not be 
interested, the incumbent will also hesitate to invest due to a lack of sufficient 
incentive. As a result, no network will be built. For the time being, both 
parties wait for the market condition to improve. 
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In the third region, P ù :> P r > P, even though it is attractive for the entrant to 
request for access, it will not be cost-effective for the incumbent to invest. 
Accordingly, no network will be built for the moment. 
In the fourth region, Pt> PTT> P, the incumbent and the entrant will both 
benefit from investing and taking on the access respectively. Consequently, 
the investment will be made. 
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5 SIMULATION 
5.1 The Impact of Aceess Priee on the Ineentives to Invest 
In the following analysis, Pü and Pi. obtained from the previous section and 
the generalized access price formula Q. = m(cN + r X) will be used in 
conjunction with different values of nt to investigate the impact of access 
price on the incentives to invest in network development. 
To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the drift is equal to zero. 
(P = r - ô = 0) . Thus: 
The values of the parameters are: 
r = 10% 
fI = 0.1 
eN = 0.5 
Cl = 1.5 
CE = 
qE = 0.3 
X = 5 
There are three possible scenarios: 
• P ü > p and pi> fi 
• pi < P and p ir < fi 
• pi > fi and Pû < P 
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Table 1: 0.1 ~ m ~ 2.9 
. . 
-
m Pu PL P 
0.1 3.6052 1.1000 
0.3 3.4979 1.3000 
0.5 3.3904 1.5000 
0.7 3.2829 1.7000 
0.9 3.1754 1.9000 
1.1 3.0678 2.1000 
1.3 2.9601 2.3000 
1.5 2.8523 2.5000 
1.7 2.7443 2.7000 
1.9 2.6362 (Take the value of P) 2.9000 
2.1 2.5278 (Take the value of P) 3.1000 
2.3 3.1250 3.3000 
2.5 3./250 3.5000 
2.7 3.1250 3.7000 
2.9 3.1250 3.9000 
By construction, ifPi ~ CE + a 
• CPl f. X] 
the solution PL = <Pl - 1 LeI + r is 
irrelevant. The incumbent's investment threshold obtained according to the 
cost-based aceess pricing should be equal to Pu. If the network has been 
built, the entrant's threshold to enter the market is P. From the table, it is 
observed that as the compensation increases, the trigger priee decreases for the 
incumbent and increases for the entrant. 
In this case, the aceess priee is set too low, thus the incumbent is 
undercompensated. On the other hand, the entrant will always find it 
beneficial to demand for access as soon as the network is built. Consequently, 
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inefficient entry might be encouraged; also investment might be untimely 
delayed. 
2. pi <pandpû <p 
Under this scenario, pi, becomes irrelevant, the incumbent's investment 
threshold is equal to PÎ .. It is observed that as the compensation increases, the 
trigger priee for the incumbent ( pi) remains unchanged, and the trigger priee 
for the entrant CP) increases. 
This is because the access price is set too high; the incumbent is 
overcompensated. However, the competitors will not be able to profit from 
entering,the market by leasing the existing network from the incumbent when 
the price is in the region where PL < Pt < P. Consequently, the network will 
be built and the incumbent will be alone in the market for a while. In the 
distant future, the priee may reach 'j;. At that time the entrant will find it 
beneficial to demand for access. Therefore, no entry will be demanded for the 
moment; competitors might choose to bypass by duplicating the network. 
3. pi. > if and p il < P 
Pi. 
pi; 
Figure 2. Priee of the finnl good ulldeq:ojug th(~ GBM. 
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When m is equal to 1.9 and 2.1, PL is irrelevant since it falls into the region 
where Pt> CE + a . However, the validity of the values of Pù requires further 
discussion. From Table 3, it is observed that the values of PlI are ail in the 
region where Pt< P. As indicated in Figure 2, the price reaches Pû at 
point A . For the region Pt < P, the solution of Pu is considered irrelevant. 
However, the price is expected to reach P at sorne point later in time because 
of the nature of the GBM. As soon as the priee hits point B B where P r= P, 
it becomes beneficial for the incumbent to make an investment. Thus, instead 
of taking the values of pi, as the optimal threshold to invest, the incumbent 
will start to build the network whenever the priee reaches P at which the 
competitor also finds it profitable to entry. 
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6 CONCLUSION: THE POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
When the access price is not optimally determined, cëterTs pari bus, the 
incumbent will invest later than it should as the upward potential for the 
incumbent is undesirably mitigated by the fixed access cost scheme while 
being trapped with the unbounded downward risks. 
Typieally, the firm will delay investment until the present value of the 
investment covers the costs inc\uding the value of the "option to wait" that 
would be forgone once the investment is made. To ensure the timely 
development of the network, on top of the fixed access priee, the entrant 
should make a lump sum payment to the incumbent to compensate its 
irreversible cost of launching the network. Thus, the incumbent will not be 
discouraged or delay in making the necessary but uncertain and irreversible 
investment. 
In essence, it is a "sharing" of inveStment costs between the incumbent and 
the entrant. If the entrant were to request for access to the upstream essential 
facility, it is obligated to bear a part of the investment costs, which are 
determined by the time of entry and the portion of the network it leases. 
Ideally the lump sum charge should be the value of the real option that the 
entrant obtained when its access were granted: it thus has the freedom of enter 
and stay in the market when P > cE' + Q. and leave the market 
when P ...;: 'E + a . It is as if the entrant has purchased an option that allows 
him to keep on buying qE as long as the price of the final goods and services 
is over the "strike price,,14. 
14 The strike priee is equal to the sum of production cost of the entrant and aceess priee; that 
is pstrike= rc +0 . 
ANNEXE A 
This appendix shows how to solve the following equation: 
l '% '% cl' F cl,'" 
-(5 P -+(r-8)p--rF = 0 2 dPI dP 
1 :1 
Assuming (J ", 0 , divide equation (A.)) by "2 er 
2 dl F + 2{r - 8) P dF _ 2r F = 0 
P dp2 0-2 dp 0-2 
Equation (A.2) is the Euler's equation and of the form 
x'2 yr. + pxy" + fJy = 0 
VIII 
(A.I) 
(A.2) 
(A.3) 
The general solution of (A.3) in any interval not containing the origin is 
determined by the roots i11 and fi'% of the equation: 
(A.4) 
If there are two different real roots: 
(A.5) 
We now guess that the solution to equation (A.3) has the form 
y=xP (A.6) 
Substituting (A.6) into the (A.3) yields: 
..t '2 1 [(x) 'P)} f- ... p..t [ [(x) '/3) [(x) 'Pl} f, + fJ(..t Tp) = x fp [PeP - 1) + pp + Pl 
(A.7) 
IX 
Thus, if /3 is a root of the quadratic equation (A4), then the Euler equation 
evaluates to zero and y = x P will be a solution. The roots of the (A.4) are: 
-Cp-1)± JCp -1)2 - 4& 
/11,% = 2 (AS) 
If the roots are real and not equal, there are two independent solutions for 
(A3): YI (~l) = x P1 and }'2(X) = xfJ~ .Therefore if Cl and Cl! are two arbitrary 
constants. 
The general solution is: 
It can be shown that this solution is unique. 
If apply the theorem to (A2), the Euler equation, then, by inspection: 
26- - ô) 
(A9) 
p= 
u 2 (A 10) 
2r 
&=--
(i= (A. 11) 
The roots are therefore: 
(A.12) 
(A13) 
Since /3 > 0 , the expression under the radical sign is strictly po~itive, which 
means the roots are real and different. Thus, we must have the general 
solution: 
(A.14) 
x 
Ch k h R ' l '(he f3 '- 0) C d" lim F(;p) = 0 ec t at 1-'2 IS a ways negahve cause. ,~~ , on ItlOn P-..o 
implies that c:r= 0, Bence, the solution to the differential equation 
1 .... d'IF t: ,).'l.. dF F 
-2 aP dpll-fv IJwdP-r =0 
must he: 
F(P)= c, pPs (A.l5) 
xi 
ANNEXEB 
This appendix shows how to solve the following equation when P < cE + a 
and when p > CF + a . 
~) dl=' F () p--r = 0 d.t} (B.I) 
1 :: 
Assuming (J :1= 0 , divide equation (B.2) by '2(1 
2 d 2 F 2{r dF 
p +--:;-- (B.2) 
Equation (B.2) is the Euler' s equation and of the form 
(B.3) 
The general solution of (B.3) in any interval not containing the origin is 
determined by the roots rpl and P: of the equation: 
(B.4) 
If there are two different real roots: 
(B.S) 
We now guess that the solution to equation (B.3) has the form 
yy = xIP (B.6) 
Substituting (B.6) into the (B.3) yields: 
xT2 1 l(xl t<p)J ,. + px 1. l(xl TqJ) l(xl '<p}] T. + 9(xf qJ) x'l{) (<p(<p -1) + P<P + <pl 
(B.7) 
xii 
Thus, if cp is a root of the quadratic equation (BA), then the Euler equation 
evaluates to zero and YY = xQJxQJ will be a solution. The roots of the (BA) 
are: 
-(P-l) ± J(P- 1)1- 48 
<Pu = 2 (B.8) 
If the roots are real and not equal, there are two independent solutions for 
(B.3): Y1(X) = xQJ~ and Ys (X) = xQJ~. Therefore if le 1 and les are two 
arbitrary constants, we must have the general solution: 
(B.9) 
It can be shown that this solution is unique. 
If we apply the theorem to (B.2) the Euler equation, then, by inspection, we 
find that: 
The roots are therefore: 
2r 
(j(j = --
.:)1 
1 Cr - 0) 
OP:& - '2 - ---;;::- -
(B.IO) 
(B.I 1) 
(B.12) 
(B.13) 
Since cp >- 0 , the expression under the radical sign is strictly positive, which 
means the roots are real and different. Thus, we must have the general 
solution: 
(B.14) 
xiii 
Ch k th '1 '(he . 0) C d" li", F (H) = 0 ec at <Pz IS a ways negatlve cause cp .• > • on ItlOn P-+o 
implies that k,.= o. Hence, the solution to the differential equation 
1 li li d 2 F . dF 
-Cl P ---1- Cr -o)P--rF = 0 
2 dp:l dp must he: 
(B.IS) 
XIV 
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